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Abstract 
We take another look at the general problem of 
selecting a preferred probability measure among 
those that comply with some given constraints. 
The dominant role that entropy maximization has 
obtained in this context is questioned by argu­
ing that the minimum information principle on 
which it is based could be supplanted by an at 
least as plausible "likelihood of evidence" prin­
ciple. We then review a method for turning given 
selection functions into representation indepen­
dent variants, and discuss the tradeoffs involved 
in this transformation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
An ever recurring theme in probabilistic inference is the se­
lection of preferred probability measures from some set of 
possible choices: we are given a state space A, a subset J 
of the set �A of probability measures on A, and are asked 
to identify a set I ( J) � J of measures that fulfill certain 
desiderata. 
One example that instantiates this abstract schema is the se­
lection of a prior probability distribution in Bayesian statis­
tics. In this case, J is the set of all probability measures 
(usually restricted to a suitable parametric family) consis­
tent with our prior information, and I ( J) is the element se­
lected as our prior, usually on the basis of some minimum 
information principle. Another example is default seman­
tics for probabilistic knowledge bases. In this case A is the 
set of all models of some propositional language, J � �A 
is the set of models of some knowledge base KB in some 
probabilistic extension of propositional logic, and I(J) is 
a set of default models of KB that reflect certain common­
sense inferences to be drawn from KB. 
A number of studies (Shore & Johnson 1980, Paris & Ven­
covska 1990, Paris 1994) have addressed the question of 
what general rationality principles should guide our choice 
of I(J), and which formal method can be used to imple­
ment these principles. From these considerations, entropy 
maximization emerges as the unique selection rule that sat­
isfies our needs in general. Another selection rule, called 
center of mass by Paris (1994), against this background, 
does not seem to be a serious competitor of entropy max­
imization. 
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. In the first part 
it is argued that center of mass inference, in spite of its poor 
performance with respect to theoretical rationality princi­
ples, is deeply entrenched in commonsense probabilistic 
reasoning. As an explanation for this phenomenon we argue 
that whereas entropy maximization is derived from a gen­
eral minimum information principle, center of mass infer­
ence might be justified by a no less viable likelihood of evi­
dence principle. In the second part of the paper we discuss 
the problem of representation dependence, both of center of 
mass and of maximum entropy inference. In (Jaeger 1996) 
a method was proposed that transforms selection rules I 
into variants i that are representation independent. In the 
current paper, results are presented that show what useful 
properties of I (particularly as expressed by rationality prin­
ciples) we have to trade in for representation independence, 
and which of these properties will be preserved in i. 
2 PRINCIPLES OF MEASURE 
SELECTION 
In this section the basic definitions for measure selection 
functions and rationality principles are provided. We here 
present a purely semantic set of definitions. This is to say, 
we introduce the selection function I as operating on sets of 
probability measures �A. and that we formulate rational­
ity principles as conditions on the geometric form of I(J) 
given the geometric form of J. The alternative approach is 
syntactic: in that approach one focuses on a specific prob­
abilistic representation language, the class A of its models, 
and sets J � �A that are described by knowledge bases in 
the language. The selection function I is then seen as oper­
ating on know ledge bases KB, and rationality principles im-
pose conditions on the syntactic form of statements valid in 
I(KB) in terms of the syntactic form of KB. This approach 
is taken by Paris (1994). 
For a finite state space A of size n, after ordering the ele­
ments of A in an arbitrary way, we can identify .6-A with 
A measure selection function I is any function that for every 
n E N maps £9!(.6-n) (the powerset of .6-n) into £9!(.6-n), 
such that I(J) � J for all J � .6-n, and I(rr(J)) = 
rr(I( J)) for all permutations 7f of (1, . . .  , n) . This last con­
dition makes sure that a measure selection function defined 
on { .6. n I n E N} can be applied unambiguously to .6-A for 
arbitrary finite A, because it then does not matter what par­
ticular order we use on A. Note that in contrast with Shore 
and Johnson (1980) and Paris and Vencovska (1990) we do 
not demand I to be point-valued, i.e. I(J) to be a single 
measure in .6. n. 
In this paper we are mostly concerned with two particular 
selection functions. The first is entropy maximization, de­
noted Ime• where from J � .6-n we select those P E J, 
P = (pl, ... ,Pn), for which H(P) :=- L:�=l Piln(pi) is 
maximal. Ime(J) is a singleton for closed and convex J; it 
is nonempty for closed J. When J is not closed, there need 
not exist an entropy maximal element in J, in which case 
I(J) = 0. 
The second selection function we here consider is Icm. 
the center of mass selection function. The center of mass 
(jh, . . . , Pn) of J � .6. n is determined by 
where J(E) is the "E-hull" around J, i.e. the set containing 
all points of R n with a Euclidean distance smaller than E 
to some element of J; .\ n is the n-dimensional Lebesgue 
measure. Taking the limit over the J (E ) in ( 1) is necessary, 
because J � .6. n has Lebesgue measure zero, so that both 
integrals in (1) would be zero when taken over J. Icm(J) 
is either a singleton (when the limit (1) exists, and the cen­
ter of mass so defined lies inside J - this is guaranteed for 
convex J), or else empty. 
Next, we briefly formulate the most important formal con­
ditions for I that were introduced as consistency axioms by 
Shore and Johnson (1980), and as (rationality) principles 
by Paris and Vencovska (1990). We state these conditions 
in a form that is semantic and generalizes the previous ver­
sions (given for point-valued selection rules I) to set-valued 
I. For intuitive motivations of the principles the reader is 
referred to (Shore & Johnson 1980) and (Paris 1994). Us­
ing the terminology of Paris and Vencovska, we here con­
sider the principles of relativization, obstinacy, indepen­
dence, and irrelevant information. 
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To define the relativization principle we need the follow­
ing notation: if A is a state space, E � A, and P E .6-A, 
then PIE E .6-E denotes the conditional distribution of P 
on E. The notation Ec is used for the complement of E. I 
satisfies the relativization principle, if the following holds: 
whenever J is of the form 
(2) 
I(J)IE :={PIE I P E I(J), P(E) > 0} = I(JB). 
The obstinacy principle says that whenever I(J) � J* � 
J, then I(J*) = I(J). 
The independence principle does not generalize as unam­
biguously from point-valued I to set-valued I, as the pre­
vious two principles. We therefore here introduce two vari­
ants, strong independence and weak independence. To de­
fine these principles, let A = E x C be a product space; for 
P E .6-A let P f E, P f C denote the marginal distributions 
induced by PonE and C, respectively. Consider J E .6-A 
of the form 
for some JB � .6-E, J0 � .6-C. We say that I satisfies the 
strong independence principle if for such J we have 
I(J) = I(JB) l8l I(J0) (4) 
:= {P l8l Q I p E I(JB), Q E I(JQ)}, 
where l8l is the standard product of measures. 
Conditions ( 4) is very strong, as it encodes an independence 
assumption not expressible by linear constraints, and that, 
in general, can be satisfied only by selecting non-convex 
I(J), even for convex J. A "linear approximation" to (4) is 
weak independence: we say that I satisfies the weak inde­
pendence principle if for J of the form (3), and all E' � E, 
C' � C we have 
infi(J)(E' x C') = infi(JB)(E') · infi(J0)(C') 
supi(J)(E' x C') = supi(JB)(E') 
· 
supi(J0)(C') 
where, e.g. infi(J)(E' x C') := inf{P(E' x C') I P E 
I(J)}. 
Closely related to the independence principles is the irrele­
vant information principle: this principle is satisfied by I if 
for J of the form (3) we get 
(5) 
To these familiar rationality principles, we add one more 
technical property that will be needed below: I is called di­
mension independentifl(J x {0}) = I(J) x {0}. 
276 Jaeger 
Strong Weak Irrelevant 
Relativization Obstin acy Independence Independence Information 
I me + + + + + 
I em + - - - -
I--ti + + - - + Idim.indep. preserves 
lme + - - + + 
lcm + - - - -
Table 1: Rationality Principles for Some Selection Functions 
3 CENTER OF MASS VS. MAXIMUM 
ENTROPY 
Table 1 lists a number of results on which selection func­
tions satisfy the rationality principles listed in the previous 
section. For the time being, we are only concerned with the 
first two lines in the table, which list (for the most part well 
known) results about maximum entropy and center of mass. 
I me• of course, satisfies all of the listed principles, and the 
fact that (under some mild additional assumptions) it is the 
only selection function that will achieve this has been pro­
posed as a reason to prefer entropy maximization over all 
other selection rules (Shore & Johnson 1980, Paris & Ven­
covska 1990). Paris (1994) is careful to point out that such 
a justification of entropy maximization hinges on what he 
calls Watts assumption: the set J of possible measures en­
codes everything that is known to the expert whose judg­
ments the selection function is supposed to model. Given 
that J is all we know, and that nonetheless we are forced to 
choose some smaller (or unique) I(J) � J, it then is natu­
ral to let this choice be guided by the 
Minimal information desideratum (MID): 
through the selection of I( J) as little as possible 
additional information beyond J should be 
assumed. 
The rationality principles now simply are rigorous condi­
tions capturing several aspects of the MID. 
Even though the MID is rather plausible, and persuasively 
leads us to the maximum entropy principle, it is not hard to 
find evidence that center of mass inference has an intuitive 
appeal as a model for commonsense probabilistic inference 
that is at least as great as that of maximum entropy. Recent 
works in which center of mass inference is applied in some 
guise are (Druzdzel & van der Gaag 1995) and (Grove & 
Halpern 1997). One source from which more or less ex­
plicit instances of center of mass inference originate is the 
fact that this selection rule arises naturally from an analysis 
of our selection problem from the point of view of Bayesian 
statistics. Let us briefly tum to this connection. 
In Bayesian statistics a belief state over a state space A is 
maintained by a probability distribution P9 on some pa-
rameter space e. Each() E e determines a distribution Po 
on A, so that a distribution pA on A is given by 
PA(B) = l Po(B)dP9. (6) 
The distribution defined by (6) is known as the predictive 
distribution. The probability distribution P9 is updated on 
observations of elements of A according to Bayes' rule. 
At first sight, this Bayesian procedure seems to have a dif­
ferent field of application than measure selection rules like 
maximum entropy, because it takes as input an observed 
event, rather than a set of admissible probability distribu­
tions. It is well known, however, that by suitable model­
ing, Bayesian conditioning and entropy maximization can 
be made to bear on the same problems, and that they then 
often yield incompatible results (see (Uffink 1996) for a re­
view of results). 
One perspective we can adopt in order to process informa­
tion presented as admissible subsets J � .6.A of distribu­
tions within the Bayesian framework is to view J as an ob­
served event J9 : =  {B E e I Po E J} in e. We can 
then simply condition P9 on J9, and obtain via the poste­
rior distribution pe a new predictive distribution on A. 
In general, e will not parameterize the whole set .6.A, i.e. 
there are P E .6.A with P -:/= Po for all (). For the case 
of finite A that we are here concerned with, however, we 
can choose e so that {Po I () E e} = .6.A. A canonical 
choice is e = .6. n' for which we then get the trivial identity 
Po = B. 
Before the constraints J have been obtained, our distribu­
tion pe one would be chosen as a non-informative prior, 
which here is the Lebesgue measure on .6. n (normalized, so 
as to yield a probability measure). The posterior pe, after 
conditioning on J (or on J (E) ( E -t 0), if J has measure 0), 
then is simply the Lebesgue measure restricted to J, and the 
new predictive distribution on A is given by (1). Thus, we 
have seen that center of mass inference really can be under­
stood as an instance of Bayesian conditioning and marginal­
ization. Since these are inference techniques that we would 
certainly not consider irrational, and yet center of mass fails 
the rationality principles emenating from the MID, we have 
to question the MID as the exclusive notion of rationality, 
and look for alternatives. We motivate a proposal for a dif-
ferent principle on which to base our notion of rationality 
by two very simple examples. 
First, consider the scenario where we are told that a cer­
tain coin is biased, and yields heads with probability in the 
interval [0.6, 0.9). What should our assumption be on the 
exact value of P (heads)? Maximum entropy prescribes 
P(heads) = 0.6. How can we then justify the (arguably 
more intuitive) center of mass solution P(heads) = 0. 75? 
In this case, we might reason as follows. We will first con­
struct a likely scenario for how the original information 
P(heads) E [0.6, 0.9) was obtained. The most plausible 
such scenario here is to assume that the coin in question has 
been tossed a number of times, that the relative frequency of 
heads has been observed, and then has been imbedded in the 
confidence interval [0.6,0.9] chosen wide enough to render 
the statement P(heads) E [0.6, 0.9) a virtual certainty. Un­
der these assumptions, it would be most reasonable to take 
for our inferred value of P(heads) the originally observed 
frequency, which would be assumed to have been 0.75. 
In a second example, suppose that we are told that in the 
first democratic parliamentary elections in the newly inde­
pendent Republic of Transcaucasia the Progressive Demo­
cratic Party (PDP) has gained at least 5% of the votes, the 
National Unity Party (NUP) has gained at least 55% of the 
votes, and that these were the only two parties on the ballot. 
What should our belief be about the actual result of the elec­
tion, i.e. what is our estimate of the probability P(PDP) of 
a random voter having voted for PDP? Maximum entropy 
says P(PDP ) = 0.45, but a probably much more sensible 
estimate is gained when we assume that the given constraint 
P(PDP ) E [0.05, 0.45) reflects the intermediate result af­
ter 60% of the votes have been counted, and that the final 
result is obtained by extrapolating this partial count to all 
votes cast, which would yield approximately 8% for PDP, 
i.e. P(PDP) = 0.08. This is different from the center of 
mass solution P(PDP) = 0.25, but shares with it the im­
portant characteristic of choosing a value in the interior of 
the constraint set, rather than on the boundary, as maximum 
entropy will do. 
The two examples illustrate a form of probabilistic infer­
ence not accounted for by entropy maximization: when we 
are given the information that the "true" distribution P be­
longs to J, we are not limited to take this infomiation at its 
face value only, i.e. as a constraint on which P E D. n we 
may choose, but we can also take advantage of the "meta­
information" that "P E J" is exactly what we got to know. 
In the examples above we have used this meta-information 
together with plausible assumptions on how information J 
typically is generated to arrive at our results. More fo�­
mally, J has been interpreted as the value of a random vari­
able whose distribution is determined by the "true" value 
P E D. n we want to infer. Thus, the selection procedure 
J � I( J) essentially becomes a statistical parameter esti­
mation problem, and the guiding principle for this selection 
can be formulated as the 
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Maximum likelihood of evidence desideratum 
(MLED): the set I(J) should contain those dis­
tributions that are most likely to produce the in­
formation J. 
One might object that in the discussion of our examples we 
have blatantly violated Watts assumption, because our ar­
guments made use of the semantic content of the variables 
heads and PDP, which is information not contained in J. 
This is true as far as the two specific results argued for in 
the examples are concerned. It does not, however, compro­
mise the MLED as a general principle that we can aim for 
even when such semantic background information is miss­
ing. The question now, of course, is how the philosophi­
cal MLED can be sharpened into formal conditions in the 
same way that the rationality principles sharpen the MID, 
and what, if any, selection functions satisfy these condi­
tions. A first such condition that one might consider is to 
require that for convex J the selected set I(J) lies in the 
(relative) interior of J. This very weak condition already 
eliminates maximum entropy, but retains center of mass as 
a possible choice. 
4 REPRESENTATION INDEPENDENCE 
4.1 THE ISSUE 
In the previous section it was argued that the failure of the 
rationality principle for center of mass need not be con­
strued as a conclusive argument against this selection rule. 
There is one rationality principle, however, whose violation 
by center of mass really is quite disturbing: center of mass 
is not language invariant (Paris 1994). This means that the 
result obtained by applying Icm to some knowledge base 
KB depends on our assumptions of what additional propo­
sitional variables there exist in our probability space except 
those actually mentioned in KB. If, for instance, in the coin­
tossing example of section 3 we had assumed that besides 
the variables heads there also is a variable quarter in our vo­
cabulary (standing for the fact that the coin in question is a 
quarter), then the mere presence of this additional variable 
will change our results for P(heads), even though there is 
no information given about quarter, let alone any informa­
tion linking heads to quarter. 
Maximum entropy satisfies language independence, but it 
fails to satisfy another property that can be seen as a fur­
ther rationality principle: representation independence. As 
a very simple illustration of the problem, we may com­
pare the results obtained by applying entropy maximiza­
tion to the two knowledge bases KB := P(A) � 0.9 
and KB1 ::= P(A1 V A2) � 0.9, where A, A1, A2 
are propositional variables. In the first case entropy maxi­
mazation yields P(A) = 0.5; in the second case P(A1 V 
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Az) = 0.75. That this is an often undesirable behav­
ior becomes clear when we substitute e.g. A=. "there ex­
ists life on Mars", A1 =."there exists plant life on Mars", 
Az =."there exists animal life on Mars". Based on examples 
like these, we can roughly describe representation depen­
dence of entropy maximization (and other selection func­
tions) as the property of returning results that depend on 
non-essential choices of language and syntax, rather than on 
semantic content only. It was not until recently, that infor­
mal, example-based, descriptions of representation depen­
dence received more rigorous underpinnings. Paris (1994) 
appears to have been the first to supply a precise concept 
of representation independence by introducing his atomic­
ity principle. This principle requires that inferred probabil­
ity values do not change when a knowledge base is trans­
lated by replacing a propositional variable by a formula in 
a new language,just as A was replaced by A1 V Az in our ex­
ample above. Paris then shows that this principle can not be 
satisfied by a selection function I that yields unique values 
I ( J) for closed and convex J. Paris and Vencovska ( 1997) 
later argue that atomicity is not a reasonable principle in 
the first place, because the fact whether representations A 
or A1 V A2 are used is relevant information that may very 
well influence our inferences. 
Halpern and Koller ( 1995) give a semantic definition of rep­
resentation independence, based on embeddings f : A -+ 
B of state spaces. This definition subsumes the atomicity 
principle, but can also be applied to selection problems not 
framed within the context of a propositional probabilistic 
logic. 
In (Jaeger 1996) a generalization of atomicity along a differ­
ent line is provided by developing a concept of representa­
tion independence for arbitrary nonmonotonic logics. That 
concept, like atomicitiy, is syntactic, based on interpreta­
tions between formal languages. 
In the remainder of this section, a definition of representa­
tion independence is given that combines elements from the 
ones found in (Halpern & Koller 1995) and (Jaeger 1996). 
In order to stay in line with the other definitions used in the 
present paper, the definitions we provide are semantic, but 
our motivation for these definitions very much derives from 
syntactic considerations. 
A definition of representation independence essentially 
hinges on a definition of what constitutes a representation 
change. In our first example, a representation change was 
given by the syntactic interpretation f : A H A1 V Az, 
which induces the mapping f : KB H KB1. Here the repre­
sentation KB1 is a refinement of the representation KB, ob­
tained by moving from a simpler to a richer language. In 
general, we will also want to deal with alternative represen­
tations of the same information, none of which is a strict 
refinement of the other. For instance, let KBz = P(Bt 1\ 
82) ::; 0.9. KB1 and KBz now represent the same informa-
tion with respect to the correspondence A1 V Az ++ 81 /\Bz. 
It is convenient to model such a correspondence as medi­
ated by a third "common ground" language, so that both 
representations are interpretations from this (poorer) lan­
guage. Here we can choose {A} as the common ground lan­
guage, and obtain KB2 = g(KB) under the interpretation 
g : A H 81 1\ 82. In the terminology of (Jaeger 1996), KB1 
and KB2 would be called representational variants with re­
spect to f and g. 
The semantic analogues of syntactic interpretations are em­
beddings of state spaces (Halpern & Koller 1995). 
Definition 4.1 Let A, B be finite state spaces. An embed­
ding of A in B is any function f : A -+ &(B) with 
a1 =I az =>/(at) n f(az) = 0, and B = UaEAf(a). 
In the case where A and B are the sets of models of propo­
sitional languages LA and LB. any syntactic interpretation 
f : X H ¢ x (X ranging over the propositional variables 
of LA, ¢x being a formula in LB) induces an embedding 
of A in B: a model a for LA is mapped to the set of models 
f (a) � B (possibly empty) in which the formulas ¢ x have 
the same truth values as the variables X have in a. 
Embeddings f : A -+ B induce a mapping f : AA -+ 
&(AB) via f(P) = {Q E AB I Va E A : Q(f(a)) = 
P(a)}. Note that we get f(P) = 0 exactly when there ex­
ists a E A with P(a) > 0 and f(a) = 0. For J � AA 
we write f(J) for UpEJf(P). For Q E AB we define 
/(Q) E AA via Q(a) := Q(f(a)). Finally, for H � AB, 
let /(H):= {/(Q) I Q E H}. 
From our informal discussion of when two knowledge 
bases are representational variants, and the definition of em­
beddings, we now derive a formal semantic definition of 
representational variants. 
Definition 4.2 Let A, B, C be state spaces, f : C -+ A, 
g : C -+ B be embeddings. Let J � AA, H � AB. We 
say that J and H are representational variants with respect 
to f and g, written J � H, iff 
/(J) = g(H). (7) 
and 
J = f(/(J)), H = g(g(H)) (8) 
Condition (7) says that J and H contain the same informa­
tion about the common ground state space C. Condition 
(8) essentially means that J and H do not contain any addi­
tional information about A and B, respectively, that is not 
given as a translated constraint on C. Condition (8) is quite 
restrictive, and in (Jaeger 1996) was not part of the defini­
tion of representational variants. We include it here solely 
for convenience, because our subsequent results only apply 
to this restricted notion. 
Definition 4.3 A measure selection function I is called 
representation independent, iff for any A, B, C, j, g, J, H 
as in definition 4.2, we have that J � H implies 
f(I(J)) = g(I(H)). (9) 
Definition 4.3 is very similar to the one given by Halpern 
and Koller ( 1995), only that their unidirectional notion of 
representation shifts is replaced by the symmetrical notion 
of representational variants. The definition of Halpern and 
Koller is here covered by the special case B = C, g the 
identity function, and f a faithful embedding (i.e. f(c) "I 0 
for all c E C). Also, it is easy to see that representation 
independence in the sense of definition 4.3 implies language 
independence. 
4.2 RE PRE SE NTATION INDE PE NDE NT 
SE LE CTION FUNCTIONS 
In this section we study representation independent selec­
tion functions. First, we review a construction presented in 
(Jaeger 1996) that allows us to transform a given selection 
function I into a representation independent variant i. To 
motivate this construction, first assume that we are given 
the situation of definition 4.2, i.e. we have the three state 
spaces A, B, C, the em beddings j, g, and the sets J, H with 
J t-4 H. We want to select subsets i ( J), i (H) such that 
(9) holds. Here there is an obvious way of doing this: we 
simply use any selection function I to choose I(j(J)) = 
I(g(H)), and then let i(J) := f(I(f(J))),i(H) := 
g(I(g(H))). Because of (8) we have i(J) � J, i(H) � 
H. 
The problem, of course, is that in general we are not given 
a special scenario J � H for which (9) has to be satis­
fied, but only some J � AA from which we have to choose 
i( J) such that (9) holds for every possible instantiation of 
the schema J � H. The key to defining i is the observa­
tion that there is a simplest state space C and an embedding 
f : C -+ A such that J = j(f(J)). For any selection 
function I we can therefore define i(J) := f(I(f(J))), 
which then defines a representation independent selection 
function i. The following definitions and results taken from 
(Jaeger 1996) (here somewhat reformulated to fit into our 
semantic framework) describe the construction. 
Theorem 4.4 Let J � AA. There exists a smallest state 
space S J and an embedding h : S J -+ A, such that 
J = h(!J(J)). SJ and hare unique up to renaming the 
elements of SJ. 
The embedding h induces a partition {h ( s) I s E SJ} on 
A. In fact, we can choose this partition itself as a canonical 
representation of SJ. The embedding h then simply is the 
identity. The function fJ : AA -+ ASJ becomes the re­
striction !J(P) = Pf SJ, and the mapping h : ASJ -+ 
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AA induced by h is the extension operator: 
Ext(Q) := !J(Q) = {P E AA I Pf SJ = Q}. 
Thus, theorem 4.4 can be restated as follows: for J � AA 
there exists a unique coarsest partition SJ of A, s.t. 
(10) 
In the following, we will understand SJ to refer to this par­
tition. 
Definition 4.5 Let I be a measure selection function. The 
measure selection function i is defined by 
i(J) := Ext(I(Jf SJ)). (11) 
Theorem 4.6 When I is a dimension independent selec­
tion function, then i is representation independent. 
The following short example illustrates the definitions and 
theorems formulated so far. 
E xample4.7 Let A = {aba2,a3,a4},B 
{b1>b2},C = {cbc2,c3}. Letf: C-+ A, g: C-+ B 
be embeddings that map c1, c2, c3 to {a1, a2}, { a3}, { a4}, 
and {bl}, {b2}, 0, respectively. Let J � AA be defined 
by the constraints P( { a1, a2}) � 0.6 and P( { a4}) = 0. 
Let H � ABbe defined by the constraint P( {bl}) � 0.6. 
Then 
J(J) = g(H) = {P E AC I P(c1) � 0.6,P({cg}) = 0}, 
and J = f(f(J)), H = g(g(H)). Hence J t-4 H. 
The partition SJ is { { a1, a2}, { a3}, { a4} }; the partition SH 
is { {b!}, {b2} }. 
Next, we computeime(J) andime(H). For lme(J) we first 
determine Jf SJ, which is {P E ASJ I P({a1,a2}) � 
0.6,P({a4}) = 0} (unlike here, it need not always 
be the case that the constraints defining J r s J are identi­
cal to the original constraints defining J). Thus, we get 
Ime(Jf SJ) = {(0.6, 0.4, 0)}, and 
lme(J) = Ext(Ime(Jf SJ)) 
= {P E AA I P({a1,a2} = 0.6,P(a4) = 0} 
Note that Ime(J) = (�, �' �' 0) tJ. lme(J). Similarly, we 
computeime(H) = {P E AB I P({bl}) = 0.6}. Finally, 
we can check that 
f(ime(J)) = {P E AC I P({c!}) = 0.6,P(c4) = 0} 
= g(fme(H)), 
so that (9) is satisfied. 
The proof of theorem 4.4, which was given in (Jaeger 1995), 
is not constructive. The following results show that at least 
in the case of J being a polytope, SJ can be effectively con­
structed. 
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Theorem 4.8 Let A = { ai, . . . , an}, let J � �A be a 
polytope defined by k linear inequality constraints ci = 
"£7=I rijP(aj) s; Si (i = 1, . . .  ,k;rij,Si E R). Then 
the partition SJ of A can be computed in time polynomial 
in kn. 
Proof: In the sequel, we denote P( aj) by Pi. Computation 
of SJ amounts to deciding the equivalence relation 
a·"' a··++ {a· a·} C B • J • ,, J - for some BE SJ. (12) 
For notational convenience, take i = 1, j = 2. For P = 
(PI,P2, .. .  ,pn) E �A we abbreviatep3, .. . ,pn byp. We 
then get: ai "'a2 iff VP = (pi,P2, p) E �A: 
P E J ++(PI+ P2,0,p) E J and (O,pi + P2,p) E J. 
(13) 
Now define for i = 1, ... , k: fi := max{ril, ri2}, and let 
Ci be the constraint defined by replacing ril and ri2 by fi 
in Ci. Let J be the polytope defined by the Ci. We show 
that 
(14) 
The left to right direction in (14) is immediate: J = J im­
plies that J is definable by a set of constraints in which PI 
and P2 only appear within terms of the form f(pi + P2), so 
that (13) clearly is satisfied. 
For the right to left direction, assume that a1 "' a2• J � J 
trivially holds, because J is obtained from J by sharpening 
each defining constraint. Let P = (PI,P2,p) E J. Con­
sider i E {1, . . .  , k }, and assume without loss of general­
ity thatfi = ril. By ( l3) we have that (PI +P2,0,p) E J. 
Since (PI + P2, 0, p) satisfies Ci iff (PI, P2, p) satisfies Ci, 
we obtain that P satisfies Ci. This holds for all i, so that 
J� J. 
A test for J � J can be conducted via k satisfiability tests 
for systems of k + 1 linear constraints on n variables. 
Each such test can be conducted in time polynomial in nk 
(e.g. (Chvatal 1983)). Finally, we have to do s; n(n- 1) 
tests of the relation "', giving an overall runtime for the 
construction of SJ polynomial in nk. 0 
So far, we only have presented some limited empirical ev­
idence that the selection functions i can still be interesting 
and useful. Example 4.7 shows that with lme nontrivial in­
ferences can be obtained. Also, if we apply lme to our ex­
ample of section 4.1, we find that we now infer P(A) = 0. 5, 
P(AI V A2) = 0.5, and P(BI 1\ 82) = 0. 5, which ar­
guably is the most reasonable result. Beyond the evidence 
provided by examples like these, the net result of defini­
tion 4.5 and theorem 4.6, so far, only is that we know rep­
resentation independent selection functions to exist. This, 
in itself, is not exciting, because the trivial selection func­
tion I, with I(J) = J for all J, already is representation 
independent. In order to evaluate the significance of the­
orem 4.6, we therefore have to look for general results on 
the properties of i. More specifically, the question of inter­
est is: how many of the original useful properties of I are 
preserved under the transformation I ---+ i, and what do we 
have to trade in for gaining representation independence? 
The first major concession we have to make is precision: 
even where I returns point values, i, in general, will only 
return intervals. By the impossibility result of Paris (1994) 
that was mentioned in section 4.1, this is an unavoidable 
weakness of representation independent selection func­
tions. Another property that often holds for I, but usually 
is lost in i is continuity (see (Paris 1994) for a formal defi­
nition). To see why this is the case, consider the state space 
A = {a I, a2}, and Je � �A defined by the constraint 
P(ai) s; 1 - €. For every E > 0 we then have SJ. = 
{{a!}, {a2}}, and obtain, e.g., lme(Je) = {(0.5,0.5)}. 
ForE= 0, however, we have J0 = �A, SJ0 = { {ai,a2} }, 
and fme(Jo) = �A. 
While the loss of precision and of continuity run counter 
conventional desiderata for a selection function, they both 
can be justified to some extent by arguing that the relevant 
state space we should consider is not so much the more or 
less arbitrarily specified underlying set A, as the set of "se­
mantic concepts" implicit in our knowledge J. The ele­
ments of SJ are just the formalization of such a notion of 
semantic concept, and the use of i corresponds to using this 
set as the truly relevant state space. Introducing a constraint 
P(ai) s; 1 - E, then, more than establishing a numeri­
cal constraint, carries the impact of introducing {a I} as a 
semantic concept that we have to account for in our state 
space. 
The following theorem provides some positive results on 
what is preserved under the transformation I ---+ i. 
Theorem 4.9 The principles of weak independence and ir­
relevant information are preserved under the transformation 
I ---+ i. If I is dimension independent, then the relativiza­
tion principle also is preserved under I ---+ i. 
Proof: (Sketch) We only prove the statement for weak inde­
pendence and irrelevant information, omitting the (simpler) 
proof for relativization. 
The key to the proof is the following observation: if J is of 
the form (3), then SJ is essentially the product of SJB and 
SJc. There is a minor complication: SJB [SJc] may con­
tain the element B0 := {b E B J VP E JB : P(b) = 0} 
[the similarly defined C0]. Then SJ will contain the "irreg­
ular" set Ao := B x Co UBo x C. The exact claim we want 
to prove is 
We denote the right hand side of ( 15) by S*. It is straightfor­
ward to verify that J = Ext(Jf S*), which shows that S* 
is a refinement of S J. It remains to show, conversely, that 
S* is a refinement of SJ. This means that we have to show 
that there do not exist distinct elements si, s2 E S* with 
si "" s2 (since S* is a refinement of SJ, the equivalence re­
lation "" also is well-defined on S* by: si "" s2 iff a1 "" az 
for some a1 E si, a2 E s2). We proceed indirectly, and as­
sume that such si, s2 exist. The case where either si or s2 
is equal to A0 easily leads to a contradiction, so we assume 
that si = (sf, sf), s2 = (sr, sf) with sf E SJB \ Bo, 
sf E SJc \Co (i = 1, 2). 
It follows that there exists P E J with P(si) > 0. From 
si "" Sz, using criterion (13), it then follows that there also 
isQ E JwithQ(si) > O andQ(s2) > 0. Marginalizing on 
B yields the result: there exists Q8 E J B with Q8 (sf) > 
0 and Q8(sf) > 0. Let E := min{Q8(sf ),Q8(sr ) }. 
From sf f sf (with "" defined by JC) it follows that 
there exists Qf E JC, Qf E D.C \ JC that agree 
on all elements of S JC except sf and sf, and such that 
I Qf (sf) - Qf (sf) I = 8 < E. Without loss of gener­
ality, assume that Qf(sf)(= Qf(sf)) = Qf(sf) + 8. 
It is readily verified, that the two marginals Q8 and Qf 
can be extended to a measure 0 on S* with O(si) = 
min{ Qc (sf), Q8 (sf)} � 8. From si ""s2 it follows that 
0' obtained from 0 by shifting probability mass 8 from si 
to s2 again is in J. But now the marginal of 0' on C is just 
Qf, which thus would have to belong to JC, contradicting 
our assumption. This completes the proof that S* � S J. 
Having established (15), the remainder of the proof for 
weak independence and irrelevant information is simple. 
From the fact that Jf SJ is of the form (3), and the assump­
tion that I satisfies the respective principles, we obtain 
(2) and (5), respectively, for i(J)f SJ = I(Jf SJ). It is 
readily verified that the validity of (2) and (5) is preserved 
when then I ( J)f S J is extended to A via Ext( I ( J)f S J). 
0 
The third line in table 1 summarizes the contents of theo­
rem 4.9 and the negative results mentioned above. Line 4 
and 5 also explicitly list the properties of lme and lcm• some 
of which can be derived directly from the entries in lines 1-
3; others require short, separate, proofs. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Rationality criteria for measure selection functions mostly 
have been formulated in terms of formal principles, or ax­
ioms. Entropy maximization has the best track record with 
respect to these principles; it is therefore often regarded as 
the one most reasonable selection rule. In this paper we 
have pointed out that rationality might also be based on the 
statistical criterion of identifying the most likely source for 
the information we are given, and that under such a changed 
perspective center of mass may look much more attractive 
than maximum entropy. 
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Representation independence is one intuitively reasonable 
formal principle that even entropy maximization fails to sat­
isfy. It has been shown that we can gain representation in­
dependence when we are willing to forfeit some of the de­
cisiveness of our inferences. This result is equally relevant 
for center of mass and for maximum entropy inference, as in 
particular it yields a language independent variant of center 
of mass. We have presented results that show that the mod­
ification of a selection rule I to its representation indepen­
dent variant i preserves at least some of those characteristic 
features of I that made I attractive in the first place. 
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